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An Interstate Water Pollution Dispute
I. Introduction
The growing public concern about water pollution has
prompted Congress to enact laws to curb destruction of our
nation's waters.1 After reaffirming2 the long established right
of states3 to bring federal common law4 of nuisance actions 5 for
interstate water pollution disputes, the United States Su-
preme Court announced in Milwaukee v. Illinois6 that Con-
gress implicitly extinguished this remedy when it enacted the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 19727
(the 1972 Amendments). The issue presented by this sudden
reversal is whether the Court erred in proscribing the use of
federal common law to resolve interstate water pollution
disputes.
1. Concern over water pollution prompted Congress to enact the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1948. This Act has been amended many times. 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
3. See generally Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520, 526 (1906). Although
Missouri could not prove that a health hazard was created by Illinois's sewage
discharge into navigable waters, the Court held that relief, based on public nuisance,
could be granted when activities of one state caused injury in another state.
4. Federal common law is "a body of a decisional law developed by the federal
courts, untrammeled by state court decisions." Black's Law Dictionary 550 (5th ed.
1979).
5. See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, 583-91 (4th ed. 1971); W. Rogers, Environ-
mental Law, 102-49 (1977). Common law nuisances are classed as private or public. A
private nuisance is a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and
enjoyment of land. Liability is premised on substantial harm and either money
damages or equitable relief can be sought. A public nuisance is an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public. Substantial harm must be
proved. T determine liability, the court "balances the equities" by weighing the
extent and character of the injury, the utility of the offending activity, the state of the
art in controlling the hurt, and the impracticality in avoiding the invasion. The
remedy, usually pursued by officers of the state, is equitable.
6. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
7. Id. at 318-19. See supra note 1.
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II. Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Facts
In 1972, Illinois filed a complaint8 under the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme CourtY Four Wisconsin cities and
two sewage commissions were named as defendants. The
complaint alleged that pathogen-containingO sewage was be-
ing dumped by the Milwaukee sewage system into the inter-
state waters of Lake Michigan, where it was contaminating
Illinois drinking water and creating a health hazard to swim-
mers." Defendants allegedly were polluting the lake by allow-
ing overflows of raw sewage from their sewer systems and
discharges of inadequately treated sewage from their treat-
ment plants to enter the lake.12
The Court declined to exercise jurisdiction because the
defendant political subdivisions were not "states" within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1), 3 and also because Wiscon-
sin was not a "necessary" party to the action and, therefore,'4
the controversy did not come within the Court's exclusive
jurisdiction. 15 The Court held that the term "laws," under 28
U.S.C. § 1331,16 which creates the original jurisdiction of the
federal district courts, embraces claims founded on federal
8. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91.
9. Original jurisdiction is jurisdiction in the first instance as distinguished from
appellate jurisdiction. Black's Law Dictionary 991 (5th ed. 1979); 28 U.S.C. § 1251
(1976) provides that:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of: (1)
All controversies between two or more States; ... (b) The Supreme Court
shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: ... (3) all actions or
proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State ....
10. Pathogens are any agents that cause disease, especially a microorganism
such as bacterium or fungus. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 960 (New College ed. 1979).
11. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 169 (7th Cir. 1979); Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. at 309.
12. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93.
13. Id. at 98; see supra note 9, 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1) (1976).
14. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 97.
15. See supra note 9.
16. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 100; 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) provides
that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy... arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States....'
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common law as well as those of statutory origin. Since federal
common law applies to air and water in their ambient and
interstate aspects,17 the issue could be litigated in federal
district court.'8 The availability of another forum meant that
the Court did not have to exercise its original jurisdiction.
The Court reviewed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(the Act) and stated that, although the remedy sought by
Illinois had not been authorized by Congress, "[it] is not
uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where
federal rights are concerned." 19 The Court concluded that "[it]
may happen that new federal laws and new federal regula-
tions may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of
nuisance."20
Five months after Illinois filed suit in federal district
court, and six months after the Supreme Court held that
Illinois could bring a federal common law of nuisance action
in the district courts, Congress enacted the 1972 Amend-
ments.21 While the district court case was pending, the Wis-
consin Department of Natural Resources (DNR), the state
permit-issuing agency,22 brought an action in Wisconsin state
court 23 to compel Milwaukee to comply with the permit. The
state court's judgment required that discharges from the
treatment plants comply with the effluent limitations24 in the
17. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 103; air pollution is governed largely by
the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858(a) (1976 & Supp. V
1981). See generally W. Rogers, Environmental Law 354-55 (1977). The 1972 Amend-
ments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act draw heavily on the Clean Air
Amendments since the same congressional committees and leaders were instrument-
al in drafting both Acts.
18. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 108.
19. Id. at 103 (quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957)).
20. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 107.
21. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 310-11.
22. The 1972 Amendments establish a National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES) under 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976). Section 1342 allows delegation
of the permit program to states that can demonstrate adequate authority to adminis-
ter it. The EPA delegated NPDES authority to the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources (DNR), the permit-issuing agency.
23. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 311.
24. Effluent limitations are "any restriction established by a State or the




permits and set a timetable for additional treatment plant
construction to control sewage overflows.25 After the state
court entered this judgment, the federal district court issued a
ruling which specified effluent limitations26 for treated sew-
age and a construction timetable to eliminate overflows which
went beyond the terms prescribed by the state permits27 and
the enforcement order of the state court.28
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's order and timetable to eliminate overflows, but
reversed as to the effluent limitations that exceeded permit
requirements. 29 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the 1972 Amend-
ments preempted the previously recognized federal common
law cause of action. 30
III. Background: General Principles of Law
A. Federal Common Law
Despite the Court's ruling in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins31 that federal courts are not general common law
courts, the Court expressly applied federal common law in an
opinion handed down the same day as Erie.32 In Erie, the
Court reversed its earlier holdings whereby federal courts
cal and other constituents which are discharged from point sources .... " 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(11) (1976)
25. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 311-12.
26. See supra note 24.
27. Each permit specifies effluent limitations. The permit holder may not
discharge beyond the terms specified in his permit.
28. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 312.
29. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d at 157, 177 (7th Cir. 1979).
30. "We therefore conclude that no federal common-law remedy was available to
respondents in this case." 451 U.S. at 332.
31. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This was a diversity action
brought in New York to recover for injuries sustained by a pedestrian on a railroad
right-of-way in Pennsylvania when he was struck by an object protruding from a
passing freight train.
32. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
The opinion was written by Mr. Justice Brandeis, who also wrote the Erie opinion.
The Court declared, "whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned
between two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the
statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive." Id. at 110.
1983]
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fashioned substantive rules of law for application to contro-
versies brought under federal diversity jurisdiction. The Mil-
waukee Court mistakenly looked to the holding in Erie and
ignored the fact that Erie is distinguishable as a diversity
case which discusses negligence in a tort action involving
private parties. In this area, federal courts must follow state
decisional law and cannot create federal common law. Erie,
however, does not address an area of dominant federal con-
cern as does Milwaukee v. Illinois.
Before Milwaukee v. Illinois, federal courts held that a
federal statute dealing with the same subject matter as the
matter before the court should be the starting point for
fashioning federal common law.33 Since legislation is often
incomplete, interstitial federal lawmaking has become a basic
responsibility of the federal courts.34 However, when a statute
occupies the field, the courts are not free to supplement
Congress35 The separation of powers, fundamental to our
government, precludes judicial preemption of congressional
action.36 When a federal court declares a rule of decision in an
area of congressional competence, it assumes a role ordinarily
left to Congress, ousts state law, and acts without the political
checks on national power created by state representation in
33. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966). The Court
held that "if there is a federal statute dealing with the general subject, it is a prime
repository of federal policy and a starting point for federal common law." See J. I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). The courts should provide remedies as
necessary to effectuate Congress's purpose.
34. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 35 (1977) (Burger, J., concurring). See
Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797, 798-800
(1957). "At the very least, effective Constitutionalism requires recognition of power
in the federal courts to declare, as a matter of common law or 'judicial legislation',
rules which may be necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the
statutory patterns enacted... by Congress."
35. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1963). "When Congress exercises
its Constitutional powers over waters, the courts cannot substitute their own notions
of an 'equitable apportionment' for an apportionment chosen by Congress."
36. G. Gunther, Cases and Materials in Constitutional Law 384 (10th ed. 1980).
The founders allocated national authority among the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches. Separation of power is symbolized by distinct treatment of each
branch in Articles I, II, and 1I of the Constitution. The Constitution reveals that
separation is not absolute. Tbgether with explicit restraints and overlaps are areas of
uncertainty and blurred boundary lines.
[Vol. 1
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Congress. 37 The threshold question in Milwaukee v. Illinois is
whether Congress intended to preclude this unusual exercise
of judicial lawmaking when it enacted the 1972 Amend-
ments.38
B. The 1972 Amendments
Before the 1972 Amendments were enacted, the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 196539 established water qual-
ity standards which specified acceptable levels of pollution for
interstate navigable waters as the primary way to control
pollution.4° The 1972 Amendments sought to replace the
cumbersome and ineffective enforcement of this program,
which focused on tolerable effects rather than on prevention. 41
In the 1972 Amendments, Congress declared national
goals mandating that the discharge of pollutants into naviga-
ble42 waters be eliminated by 1985. 43 The Amendments intro-
37. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1975); Cf.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbothem, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978). Courts are not free to
prescribe rules for obtaining a federal injunction different from those prescribed by
Congress.
38. Where the legislation contains no express intent as to the continued applica-
tion of federal common law, an unexpressed legislative intent must be reconstructed
to determine if it is to be implied. See Note, The Limits of Implied Constitutional
Damages Actions: New Boundaries for Bivens, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1238, 1248-49
(1980).
39. This was also known as the Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. Law 89-234, 79
Stat. 903 (1965).
40. EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976). See W.
Rogers, Environmental Law 415-16 (1977).
[A] water quality standard consists of water quality criteria, designated
uses, and a plan of enforcement ... Water quality criteria ... are ...
permissible amounts of pollutants allowed in a defined water segment...
Designated uses are accomplished by assigning segments of water to
certain classes and defining the classes by reference to use. Thus, Class A
waters must be suitable for recreation, and Class B waters suitable 'for the
growth and propagation of fish ... .' The enforcement plans ... were typi-
cally vague directives to a particular source, such as to install 'secondary
treatment or its equivalent....'
41. EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 203.
42. United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
In 1972, Congress redefined the term "navigable waters" to mean the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1976).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
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duced major changes in setting and enforcing standards to
abate and control pollution." In addition to achieving accept-
able standards of water quality, the Amendments aimed at
achieving maximum "effluent limitations"' 45 at "point
sources."46 This goal was to be attained by specific dates47
through technology-based levels of treatment.4 The Amend-
ments established the National Pollution Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES), 49 making it unlawful to discharge
pollutants without first obtaining a permit issued by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and complying with
the permit's terms.50 The EPA is authorized to delegate to the
states authority to issue NPDES permits and administer
their own programs.51 These programs are subject to EPA veto
for noncompliance with conditions set forth in the Amend-
ments.52 Although dischargers must meet the minimum efflu-
ent limitations prescribed in the Act and in EPA regulations,
states may enact more stringent limitations." State agencies
must notify the EPA of all permits issued, and if the waters of
another state may be affected, the other state must be in-
formed so that it can submit written recommendations. If
44. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 318-19.
45. See supra note 24.
46. Point source is defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1976) as "any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated
animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are
or may be discharged."
47. The specific dates are included in a "schedule of compliance." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(17) (1976).
48. EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 204 n.11.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
50. Id.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976) states: "It is the policy of Congress to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate pollution."
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1) (1976). The EPA may require modifications or revision
of a submitted program.
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976). The opinion in Milwaukee v. Illinois refers to this as
§ 510, which is the designation used in the Statutes at Large. The parallel United
States Code citations for the sections to which reference is made in the opinion are:
Section 402-33 U.S.C. § 1342; § 505-33 U.S.C. § 1365; § 510-33 U.S.C. § 1370;
§ 511-33 U.S.C. § 1371.
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these recommendations are not adopted, the issuing state
must give a written explanation to both the complaining state
and the EPA.M The EPA may veto the issuance of a permit if
the waters of another state may be affected. 55 The Administra-
tor of the EPA may intervene in an emergency to protect the
health or economic livelihood of people faced with a water
pollution hazard.56 The Act spells out enforcement proce-
dures5 7 and includes a provision for citizen suits.5
The Act was amended in 197759 to provide for public
hearings for objections to the issuing state's permit. If a
hearing is not requested within ninety days, or an acceptable
permit is not issued, the EPA may issue the permit.6° The
EPA was authorized, under certain conditions, to extend
compliance dates.6 1 The 1977 Amendments also directed the
EPA to conduct a study and report to Congress on the "status
of combined sewer overflows in municipal treatment works
operations" to determine whether new legislation is needed to
address this problem.62
In its 1981 decision, the Milwaukee Court set the outer
limits for bringing actions against industry in pollution dis-
putes. Federal common law nuisance suits can no longer be
brought if industry complies with the 1972 Amendments. The
Act is scheduled for review in 1983, at which time industry
will try to exert its influence to ease the burdens imposed by
the 1972 Amendments.
54. 33 U.S.C, § 1342.
55. Id.
56. W. Rogers, Environmental Law, 536 (1977).
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1976).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976). Section 505(e) provides that "Nothing in this section
shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or
to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a state
agency)."
59. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, codified at 33
U.S.C. 99 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1981).
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g),(h),(i) (Supp. V 1981).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1375(c) (Supp. V 1981).
1983]
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IV. Decision of the Court
In 1979, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
ruled that the 1972 Amendments did not preempt federal
common law of nuisance actions to resolve interstate water
pollution disputes. 8 In 1981, however, the Supreme Court
decided that no federal common law remedy is available to
Illinois.64 The Court reconciled its 1972 decision in Illinois v.
Milwaukee 5 by noting that unless federal common law was
created in the earlier case, Illinois would not have had any
forum in which to protect its interests.s By a divided vote, the
majority of the Court held that this remedy should no longer
be available because the 1972 Amendments, which establish
a comprehensive regulatory program6 7 supervised by an ex-
pert administrative agency,68 left no interstices to be filled by
federal common law.69
The Court held that because federal courts are not gen-
eral common law courts, it is unnecessary for Congress to
show a clear and manifest intent to proscribe federal judicial
law.70 It is sufficient that Congress has enacted a comprehen-
sive program7' which provides satisfactory relief from the
63. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151.
64. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304.
65. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
66. 451 U.S. at 325; 406 U.S. at 103. The remedy sought by Illinois was not
within the scope of remedies provided by Congress prior to the enactment of the 1972
Amendments. The Amendments completely revised the prior Act, which was both
cumbersome and inadequate.
67. See 451 U.S. at 318 & n.12. The Court relies heavily upon congressmen's
remarks about the legislation.
68. Id. at 317. "We conclude that... Congress has occupied the field through the
establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert
administrative agency." Id. at 325. The Court herein expresses doubt as to the
judiciary's ability to comprehend complex technical problems.
69. Id. at 323. "There is no 'interstice' here to be filled by federal common law."
70. Id. at 316-17. The Court concludes that despite the existence of jurisdiction,
federal courts cannot apply federal rules absent an applicable Act of Congress.
Because the judiciary is insulated from democratic pressures, federal rules of na-
tional concern should be enacted by the people through their congressional represen-
tatives.




problem addressed. The appropriate standards to apply
should be left to the legislature.7 2
The dissent argued that the Court failed to recognize the
unique role federal common law plays in resolving interstate
disputes and in implementing congressional will in the fulfill-
ment of federal policies which require a uniform rule of
decision.73 Noting a clear intent in the statutory language not
to foreclose prior causes of action,74 the dissent concluded that
federal common law should be available to effect a reconcilia-
tion of the differences when a state with high water quality
standards is threatened by the less stringent regulatory
scheme of a neighboring state.75
V. Analysis of the Decision
When Congress fully addresses a problem, the imposition
of federal common law is unnecessary and unjust. If a dis-
charger relies upon a permit which sets effluent limitations,
federal common law should not contradict or add to the
statutory scheme. The majority of the Milwaukee Court con-
vincingly argues that the 1972 Amendments not only im-
prove prior legislation, but also authorize enforcement proce-
dures which now make it difficult to find omissions in the
statute.
76
72. Id. at 326, where the Court notes that it would be inconsistent with the
statutory scheme if the courts applied their own rules after permits had been issued
and permittees have relied upon them. See Envtl. L. Inst., Fed. Envtl. L., 788 (1974).
Because federal common law evolves on a case by case basis, no discharger will know
what standards are applicable to his operation until sued and the court balances the
equities.
73. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 334-35.
74. Id. at 339-40. The dissent states that the majority puts a strained reading on
the statutory language of § 505 by saying that "this section" permits preexisting
remedies, but the rest of the statute does not. See S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
81 (1971), reprinted in (1972) U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3746-47. "[This
section would specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any law. Thus, if
damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with
requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for
pollution damages."
75. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 351.
76. 451 U.S. 304.
1983]
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Despite the 1977 Amendment's authorization to the EPA
to conduct studies so that Congress can determine whether
new legislation is needed, 77 there is little room left for im-
provement in an act whose goal is the elimination of pollut-
ants from the nation's waters by 1985.78 The problem lies
rather in the complex "state of the art" construction projects
mandated by the Act, which take many years to complete and
require extensive financing. 79 Government cutbacks in fund-
ing and delays in construction, rather than inadequacies in
the Act, are to be blamed for failure to achieve the Act's
goals.8 0
Contrary to the dissent's argument that the statutory
scheme is inadequate, 81 the 1972 Amendments deal directly
with the abatement of interstate water pollution. The EPA
Administrator must be apprised of all permits issued and can
void any permit not in compliance with the Act. 2 A state
whose waters are affected by the less stringent requirements
of another state is notified of any permit applications and has
an opportunity to be heard both by written recommendations
to the permitting state and to the Administrator, and, if
necessary, at a public hearing on the permit application.3 If a
stalemate develops between the states, the EPA can issue its
own permit.84 Also, the Administrator may sue to enjoin any
imminent health hazards. 85 The 1972 Amendments thus pro-
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1375(c).
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1281(b) (1976) provides that "[w]aste treatment management
plans and practices shall provide for the application of the best practicable waste
treatment technology...."
80. W. Rogers, Environmental Law 471 (1977). The 1977 Amendments (Clean
Water Act), as well as the 1981 Amendments, provide for extensions of deadlines for
industry to be equipped with the technology required by the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)
(Supp. V 1981). They call for an economic balancing test which includes "consider-
ation of the reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a
reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived .... " 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
81. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 352.
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (1976).
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4) (Supp. V 1981).




vide administrative redress not previously available, and
make unnecessary the federal common law of nuisance rem-
edy which supplemented prior pollution abatement statutes.
The dissent argued86 that because the Act permits states
to impose stricter standards than those set by the EPA, the
federal courts should be able to reconcile these differences.
Although the statute is unclear as to whether the Adminis-
trator can veto a permit on grounds other than noncompliance
with the statute, it would be inequitable to impose stricter
standards than those relied upon by the discharger. A com-
plaining state should not be permitted to force an out-of-state
discharger, whose permit requirements may be more strin-
gent than the Act requires, to comply with the standards the
complaining state has set for itself. Because neither state
should be subjected to the laws of the other,87 or be subjected
to ad hoc judicial decisions, the statutory scheme provides a
satisfactory solution in an impartial manner.
At no time during this lengthy litigation did Illinois avail
itself of statutory redress through participation in public
hearings or through written recommendations to Wisconsin
and to the EPA.88 Illinois's claim that these statutory oppor-
tunities are not mandatory 89 is no reason to allow an alterna-
tive route through federal common law. Illinois's argument
that the remedies afforded under the 1972 Amendments were
not available at the time the suit was commenced in 197290 is
also unpersuasive in light of the five-year permit review
cycle. Milwaukee's permit was reviewed some time between
1972 and 1981, at which time Illinois could have invoked the
available statutory remedies.
VI. Conclusion
The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act made a major contribution to the abatement of
86. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 351.
87. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
88. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 326.
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water pollution. Although courts have the power to fashion
federal common law to effectuate congressional policy, they
are not free to substitute their own notions of how best to
protect national interests once Congress has acted. Because
the 1972 Amendments provide a comprehensive program to
deal with interstate water pollution, the application of federal
common law, which once filled a void in the statute, can no
longer be justified.
Millicent Greenberg, Class of '83
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